The role and import of computational methods, particularly those deployed in the sciences, have showed that technical artifacts such as scientific instruments play a central and indispensable part in knowledge-creation endeavors. Furthermore, the complexity, opacity, and the novel and unique affordances (Formánek, 2025;2026) of computational technologies demonstrate that they can, at times, play this part in a way that is non-trivially distinct and often independent of theory, of experimental practices and, importantly, of human intervention (Humphreys, 2004; Baird, 2004; Alvarado, 2023). Conventional epistemological frameworks, which are often infused with anthropocentric or biocentric imaginaries— e.g., intentionality, beliefs, attitudes, social consensus, intelligence, etc. — seem to lack the hermeneutical resources to account for the epistemic role and import of these and other technical artifacts. In light of the ubiquity of computational methods in contemporary knowledge-creation practices, in this talk I argue for the need of a research program that addresses this gap: namely, I argue for the development of concepts that serve an artifactual epistemology (Alvarado, 2025).