Computer Programs are one the most central entities of computing. Yet, it remains unclear what kind of thing we are talking about. Are programs best understood as mathematical entities, physical processes, linguistic constructions, or social practices? In this talk, I offer a conceptual diagnosis for the ongoing metaphysical ambiguity surrounding such entities. Specifically, I argue that a central reason why we struggle to pin down their ontological nature lies in their unclear definition: a closer look at the etymology of programs reveals that their polysemic character is grounded in the pluralistic nature of computer science qua discipline, including traits from mathematics, the empirical sciences, and engineering. While the resulting linguistic ambiguity is largely innocuous, I submit that it is one of the root causes for why we historically and presently struggle in our metaphysical inquiries of programs. Ontological debates about whether they are abstract or concrete tend to stumble upon unnoticed shifts in reference. What looks like a disagreement about metaphysics can often be deflated to a conflation of referents under a shared label.