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SUMMARY:Spontaneity\, Agency\, and the Limits of Predictive Computation - 
 Lilia Endter
DTSTART;TZID=US/Central:20260717T155000
DTEND;TZID=US/Central:20260717T162000
DTSTAMP:20260726T101121Z
UID:pretalx-iacap-2026-R9GNNW@pretalx.iacapconf.org
DESCRIPTION:Contemporary approaches in artificial intelligence and cogniti
 ve science increasingly rely on predictive and computational models to exp
 lain cognition and behavior. Across predictive processing\, Bayesian model
 ing\, and data-driven analysis\, cognition is treated as a sequence of cau
 sal\, rule-governed\, and time-indexed operations optimized for prediction
 . While empirically productive\, these approaches implicitly rely on norma
 tive distinctions between cognition and mere behavior\, correct and incorr
 ect inference\, or rational and irrational action\, without thematizing th
 eir epistemological basis. This paper argues that such predictive framewor
 ks presuppose a concept they tend to obscure: spontaneity. Reconstructing 
 the concept from early modern philosophy through Kant’s transcendental a
 ccount and its critical reinterpretation in Adorno\, the paper shows that 
 spontaneity functions as a limit concept internal to rational explanation.
  It names the activity through which inferential rules and representationa
 l schemes acquire normative bindingness\, yet which cannot itself be captu
 red as a causal or computational process. By neglecting the historical and
  conceptual conditions of this normativity\, predictive approaches risk fo
 reclosing social critique by presenting historically contingent epistemic 
 forms as exhaustive descriptions of cognition. Recovering spontaneity as a
  critical concept enables an immanent analysis of how predictive reason re
 shapes agency\, normativity\, and social intelligibility without rejecting
  its scientific achievements.
LOCATION:Executive Conference Room
URL:https://pretalx.iacapconf.org/iacap-2026/talk/R9GNNW/
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